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COMMENTARY
THE LAW AND SOCIOLOGY OF BOILERPLATE

tf

Todd D. Rako

In my view, the scholarship presented at this symposium demonstrates
that, in order to analyze form contracts and boilerplate successfully, one
must carry out a set of operations that embodies an approach I will call law
and sociology. But I presume I was invited to be a commentator at this con
ference on boilerplate not because the article I wrote on one branch of the

subject awhile back exemplified this methodological approach, but because
it took a rather strong substantive position. 1 And so I think I ought first to
say a brief word about that.

The article in question concerned contracts of adhesion in, roughly
2
speaking, the consumer context, and the position I took was that what I
called the "invisible" terms of those contracts-the large number of terms
not disciplined by the actual bargaining or shopping behavior of consumers
even in price-competitive markets--ought to be treated by the law as pre
sumptively unenforceable. The burden should be put on drafting firms to
show their form terms were worth judicial enforcement rather than on ad
herents to the forms to show the terms were unconscionable; and if this
burden were not met, the courts should apply the general, legally implied
default terms instead of the drafter's terms. This was not then, and is not
now, the law, but I would not be candid if I did not say that I still think that,
as regards the domain I was addressing, I was right.
In particular, I

am

not persuaded by the article presented at this sympo

sium that seems to me most directly to challenge my thesis (although by no
means aimed at me personally): Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner's One
3
As I understand it,

Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets.

Bebchuk and Posner assert that what appear to be "one-sided" consumer
contracts in fact function to allow firms, concerned about their reputations,
to satisfy those consumers who have worthy complaints while resisting
*

Byrne Professor of Administrative Law, Harvard Law School.

1.
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv.
1173 (1983).
2.

More precisely, the situation discussed was defined by seven attributes involved in mass

contracting, of which the last was: "The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction
considered as a whole is the payment of money." Id. at 1177.

3.
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer
Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006). I understand that a piece by Jason Scott Johnston, The
Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative
Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006), will be part of the
printed version of the symposium, although not the public presentation. I have read a draft of the
article and have roughly the same response to it that I make to Bebchuk and Posner.
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other customers who present complaints that are overblown or unjustified.
Since this may be to the benefit of most consumers, the existence of these
one-sided contracts does not show that consumers do not understand what
they are agreeing to. In such circumstances, Bebchuk and Posner say, the
"courts would do well to take a hard line in enforcing the terms of one-sided
4
consumer contracts in the absence of evidence of fraud." For if this is done,
then in the shadow of the law where most cases will be decided, the one
sided terms of the form contracts will be counterbalanced by the other-sided
nature of the market in reputation, in which sellers worry about their good
name much more than consumers do theirs. Apparently, this approach is to
apply without regard to how harsh the content of the form terms is, because
the primary function of the form terms is to give firms the room they want in
which to maneuver.
Without belaboring the issue, Bebchuk and Posner seem to me to do
nothing to show that this combination of judicial enforcement and the repu
tational concerns of firms will produce systematically desirable results.
There is no reason to think it will in any way lead firms to recognize volun
tarily the supposed legitimate claims of decent consumers at a volume or a
value that is congruent with, or even regularly near to, any known measure
of a proper number-resembling, that is, either any known legal measure of
harm or any known economic measure of an incentive for efficient behavior.
They offer no model of how the market in reputation works, or of why the
values it generates are responsive to anything other than finns' fears of how
much reputational damage particular claimants are, for a myriad of possible
reasons, in a position to cause. Nor do they consider whether the existing
transaction costs of the legal system might allow firms to differentiate be
tween merited and unmerited claims even if consumers are able to claim
reasonable

legal rights.

Finally,

on a

somewhat

different dimension,

Bebchuk and Posner do not consider the impact on the individual liberty of
consumers of a practice of giving firms (with the help of the proposed stan
dard for legal enforcement) a blank check so blank that, when after
contracting disputes do arise, consumers are forced to be nothing more than
supplicants.

5
Well, perhaps it is not surprising that I still think what I think. I am not

going to go on this way because I have already said in my prior article what
I have to say. I would much rather try to address the much broader range of
issues and much more varied set of situations raised by the rest of this col
lection of articles.
The articles presented at this symposium are remarkable for the intelli
gence with which they approach the problem of boilerplate, for the amount
of work they represent (especially those based on empirical investigation),
and for the variety of approaches taken and subjects addressed. It is too
much to hope to find a unified conclusion that all the papers would support.

4.

Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 3, at 834.

5.

But if the reader wants to see a pretty good straight-on attack on my article, he should

read Randy E. Barnett, Consenting

to

Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627 (2002).
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But I do think there is a single thread that appears in the fabric of many of
the papers that is worth teasing out. It is, as I have already suggested, a
methodological thread, and the essence of it can be stated simply: in order to
understand boilerplate and to determine the law's proper response to it, one
must approach it by building a structural model of how it is produced and
used that goes beyond the model assumed both in ordinary contract law and
in much of the economic analysis of law as well. Or, more simply, what the
articles reveal is the need for a sophisticated and differentiated law and so
ciology of boilerplate.
It is not a new idea that legal rules can only be evaluated when viewed
as constituent parts of a working social system. Indeed, built into the stan
dard doctrinal treatment of ordinary (that is, non-boilerplate) contracts, one
can already see an implicit institutional dynamic. We should support the
regime of contracts, we are told, because the practice of making, relying on,
performing, and enforcing contracts enhances welfare and enlarges freedom.
While these asserted connections between contract and welfare and freedom
are often treated as if they were in some sense "natural," they in fact rest on
two structural constructs. They rest on an assumed form of the direct rela
tionship between the parties, and on an assumed market in which the parties'
relationship is embedded.
Viewed as a dyadic interaction, contracts are assumed to be the product
of bargaining and mutual assent. Enforcing their terms presumptively en
hances welfare because parties generally know what is good for them. When
they trade quid pro quo, each party choosing what he is to get over what he
is to give, each party comes out better off, and the same set of resources
produces greater satisfaction overall. And enforcing the terms of contracts
also presumptively enlarges freedom because each party chose to enter the
arrangement. Taking someone's voluntary commitments seriously both dig
nifies his freedom and also enhances his opportunities for expressing that
freedom.
Viewed now as part of a working social system, contracts are assumed to
be the products of competition in the marketplace. Speaking systemically,
enforcing the terms of contracts presumptively enhances welfare because
competition establishes conditions under which the individual deals people
make lead, as if guided by an invisible hand, to an efficient use of society's
resources to satisfy wants. Enforcing contractual terms under these condi
tions also presumptively enhances freedom because competition among the
participants on one side of the market (for instance, among employers or
producers) creates, as much as possible, choice and an absence of duress for
those on the other side (for instance, for workers or consumers).
Many rules of the general law of contracts reflect these assumptions in
doctrinal form. The modem theory of consideration, which makes a promise
presumptively worthy of enforcement merely because it was bargained for a
6
return promise or performance, is one. The refusal to treat general social

6.

Thus, the Second Restatement of Contracts says that consideration is satisfied-that is, a

promise is presumptively enforceable-if the promise was bargained for a performance or return
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circumstances as constituting duress, so long as a competitive market is in
place, is another. 7 If we assume that these doctrines are intended to further
freedom and welfare, they do so only because of the postulated underlying
dynamics.
Any such model of course never matches all the features of the circum
stances to which it is applied; to require that would be to demand an infinity
of models to match the innumerable quirks of life. Fit is always to some
extent a matter of judgment. But the question of the fit of this standard con
tractual sociology as regards boilerplate has been an explicit topic of
concern for contracts scholars-especially with regard to consumer con
tracts, but also, for example, with regard to franchise arrangements-at least
8

since Friedrich Kessler's famous article on contracts of adhesion.

Unless we say that the value of simplicity is so great that we will apply
the traditional model even when it fits very poorly, we have two main
choices. Either we can take the elements of the standard model-individual
actors, bargains, and markets-and try to have a more subtle understanding
of them; or we can introduce additional structural features. To some degree,
of course, the two paths merge; the dividing line between additional subtlety
and additional features is a blurry one. But it seems to me that the older arti
cles that discussed boilerplate in terms of markets dominated by monopolies
9
and the recent articles that expanded the "rational actor"

or oligopolies,

with ideas of "bounded rationality," "satisficing" instead of maximizing, and
the numerous heuristic mistakes ordinary people make, to fall within the
"standard model, more subtlety" group. So do some of the articles at this
symposium. But many of the articles here collected do something different.
Looking at the facts regarding how, in particular contexts, boilerplate is pro-

promise, with no further showing of the justice of enforcement required. By contrast, if enforcement
is sought on the grounds that the promise was relied on or that it was given in recognition of a pre
viously received benefit, the justice of enforcement must be independently shown. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 71, 79, 86, 90 (1981) .
7.
Thus, in the paradigmatic case of a transaction that was overturned purely and simply
because of the impact of general circumstances not caused in any respect by the other party, who
merely took advantage of them, the Court said:
The contrivance of an auction sale, under such circumstances, where the master of [the
stranded ship] was hopeless, helpless, and passive-where there was no market, no money, no
competition-where one party had absolute power, and the other no choice but submission
where the vendor must take what is offered or get nothing-is a transaction which has no char
acteristic of a valid contract.
Post v. Jones, 60 U . S. 150, 159 (1856) (auctioning off for very little money the cargo of a
whaling ship stranded in the Bering Straits with winter coming on and few other ships around). The
contrary view, that even in a competitive marketplace, transactions can be coercive-for instance,
for the poor or for the unskilled worker-is surely not frivolous. Indeed, this point of view is repre
sented in some statutory law-for instance, in statutes establishing minimum wages--even though it
is surely not adopted by the common law of contracts.
8.
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contracts,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 636 (1943) .
9.

E.g., Kessler's article, id. at 632 .

E.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Elec
tronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002).
IO.
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duced and used, their authors have found that the gap between the assumed
general model underlying contract law and the phenomena to be addressed
is so great as to be unbridgeable simply by positing deviations from perfect
contractors or perfect markets. Instead, they have had to take note of and
build models based on additional institutional and cultural structures. In do
ing so, while I do not say that they will adopt the term, they seem to me to
have crossed into terrain best labeled "law and sociology."
The models developed in these various essays are by no means the same,
either in the social phenomena highlighted or in the legal conclusions pro
posed. Whether the differences among these various models reflect the
variety of observed social life or simply the many eyes of different behold
ers seems to me a topic for another day after more work has been done. For
the present, what seems to me more important is to look at the range of is
sues that these essays suggest ought to be addressed. As I count them, there
are four sorts of considerations that go into the making of the more complex
types of model these authors use.
First, if we are to cover the range of situations in 'Which boilerplate ap
pears, we need a particularized identification of the parties involved. The
characters that stalk the Restatements of Contracts are the well-known,
acontextual "A" and "B"; prior thinking about boilerplate has extended this
to "firm" and "consumer," and sometimes "insurance company." But on the
evidence of these papers, prior thinking has not gone nearly far enough. The
model that Omri Ben-Shahar and James J. White present in Boilerplate and
11
Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, for example, is not just
a model of "sophisticated businesses" making deals with "sophisticated
businesses"; it is specifically a model of "Original Equipment Manufactur
ers" doing business with their "tier-1" suppliers. At least some of their
explanations for what they find in the parties' contract forms tum on the
particularity of this relationship.

12

Moreover, the portraits of parties drawn in these more complex designa
tions often have reference not to how the parties are situated vis-a-vis a
contractual or market relation but rather to other features of their social or
institutional positions. Much of the mystery that Stephen Choi and Mitu
Gulati investigate relates specifically to sovereign issuers of debt using lan
13
guage that has in view non-sovereign issuers. The alternatives that Kevin
14
Davis discusses relate specifically to nonprofit drafters of form contracts.
Or, to use other words, implicit in the analysis of many of the papers is the

11. Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic Power in Auto Manufac
turing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2006).
12.
See, e.g., their discussion of the degree to which tier-I companies can successfully hold
up the Original Equipment Manufacturers for additional benefits after the contracts have been
signed. Id. at 974-76.
13.
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 113334 (2006).
14.
Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1075 (2006).
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claim that, in order to determine the law rightly, we need to consider the
particular institutional location of the parties involved.
Second, to understand many of the dynamics of the use of boilerplate, it
seems we need to consider the broad network of relationships that these in
stitutionally located entities have. The law of contracts usually focuses, and
focuses rather narrowly, on the direct relationship of the entities that are
making a deal (who are typically, in the litigation context, the juridically
defined parties). When we build models of what is actually going on regard
ing boilerplate, however, we find that what those who make deals do, is
greatly influenced by what others are doing--0thers with whom they are not
making deals but with whom they are linked in systematic relationships.
Of course, a dynamic of this sort was to some degree implicit in the tra
ditional view that parties were greatly affected by the market. This approach
remains important for considering the uses of boilerplate, too. We find, for
example, that boilerplate used to define the obligations undertaken in some
instruments is standardized because standardization facilitates creation of a
market for these cofitractual instruments, which are meant to be publicly
15
traded. But many of the essays in this collection consider other, rather par
ticular, institutional contexts that structurally link drafters or users of
boilerplate. Thus, we find that the boilerplate used by any one insurance
company will tend to be the same as that used by another in good part be
cause that standardization enables actuarial data to be collected and shared
16
across a much larger set of language-defined "events." Meanwhile, in yet
other industries, such as construction or real estate-in which contractual
instruments are neither put on the market nor subject to an actuarial risk
analysis-contractual terms are often standardized for the yet different rea
17
son that they are drafted by one or a few trade associations. Yet elsewhere,
perhaps because none of these dynamics is in play, the terms used by any
one firm may be standardized for its customers but quite different from the
18

terms insisted on by its competitors.

Third, the implication of several of these essays is that the category
"boilerplate" has itself taken on a cultural meaning, and that that fact is of
practical significance. A set of contractual words represented to be, and ac
cepted

as,

boilerplate-accompanied

by

the

meaning

(articulated

or

implied) that "this is boilerplate" or "these are standard terms" or "we al
ways use terms like these" or "everyone uses terms like these"-is different
in important ways from the same set of words absent those assertions.
Indeed, there are at least three sorts of differences. First, lawyers in a
position unilaterally to draft contracts treat boilerplate differently. Indeed,

15.
Choi & Gulati, supra note 13, at 1140-41 (swaps and derivatives); Douglas G. Baird,
The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REv. 933, 947 (2006) (commodities contracts).
16.
Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1105, 1114 (2006).
17.

Davis, supra note 14, at 1078.

Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 11, at 958-63 (automobile manufacturers); Ronald J.
18.
Mann, "Contracting" for Credit, 104 MICH. L. REv. 899, 907-08 (2006) (credit card issuers).
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we have the suggestion that even when premier law firms draft instruments
running to billions of dollars, it may be true that "no one will have an incen
tive to figure out the true meaning of such terms. Instead, attorneys will
19
uncritically include the terms in all their contracts." Second, as some of the
essays point out, the fact that language is boilerplate can be used strategi
cally in negotiating deals and contracts. The assertion "this is boilerplate"
20
can be used to signal that certain terms are not negotiable or to create fa
vorable focal points in negotiations that are inherently cooperative and
21
Third, partly as a result of the preceding dy

distributive at the same time.

namics, boilerplate may not relate to the resulting document in the same
way that the same words, if not boilerplate, would. If the purpose of a para
graph was to be the "x" boilerplate term, perhaps subtle differences in
expression between it and other contracts' ways of saying "x" are not sig
22
Or if, as Henry Smith suggests, various structural forces will lead

nificant.

a contract made of boilerplate to be more modular than a bespoke one is,
more an agglomeration of different clauses not strongly connected to each
other, then perhaps we should simply expect more disjointedness in the
23
document viewed as a whole.
Fourth, as is perhaps already clear, boilerplate, seen in light of the insti
tutional and cultural points already made, sometimes intersects with legal
rules differently from the way ordinary contract language does. If Henry
Smith's point, just mentioned, is right, then we should perhaps depart from
the usual rule of contract construction that expects the same word in differ
ent parts of a document to mean the same thing. To follow our usual practice
may misinterpret the actual meaning of the language in light of the dynam
ics involved in its creation.
Perhaps of greater importance, several of the papers make a special
point of the need to pay close attention to the incentives created by ordinary
legal rules when applied to the particular institutional context at hand. They
want us to consider the real possibility that the dynamics created by a rule
may in context produce a result that is quite different from, possibly oppo
site to, what was intended. For example, Robert Hillman worries that a rule
requiring ongoing website disclosure of a firm's standard terms for its e
sales might not only fail to achieve its intended goal of generating market
forces adequate to discipline the terms, but might also give firms an

19.

Choi & Gulati, supra note 13, at 1154.

20.
David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Con
tracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive
Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 987 (2006).
21.
(2006).
22.

Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1053-66
Choi & Gulati, supra note 13, at 1149-50.

23.
Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1175 (2006).
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argument that will insulate their terms from being disciplined by the doc
24
trine of unconscionability.
Of course, the possibility that the rules of contract law might be counter
productive is not new; there have long been claims that, for instance, the
25
Statute of Frauds enables more frauds than it prevents. And this idea has
had theoretical form at least since Robert Merton's famous article regarding
unanticipated consequences appeared in 1936 in the American Sociological
26
But the point the present articles seem to bring home is that it is

Review.

not possible to trace the actual incentive effects of various rules of the game
without a considerable amount of institutional specificity. Thus, for exam
ple, Michelle Boardman points out that when courts interpret ambiguous
language in insurance policies distinctly against the drafting companies,
intending to teach them a lesson and to spark clearer redrafting, the courts in
fact add value to the very language that they have now made clear. The
value of a term to an insurance company is to be judged primarily by how
clearly it defines an actuarial risk rather than by how likely it is to be con
strued in the company's favor in a particular lawsuit. Construing it against
the drafting party, but construing it clearly, thus makes redrafting less, not
27
more, likely.
To summarize, if we are to build an adequate descriptive model of how
boilerplate is produced and used and of the effect of legal rules on the proc
ess, we need to consider: the types of parties involved in the transaction,
described with some degree of institutional specificity; the structured ways
in which they interact with other parties, including parties not involved in
the deals at issue; the cultural meaning of boilerplate in the particular con
text; and the various incentives (intended or unintended) any proposed rules
will create in light of the actual use being made of boilerplate. Seen in this
light, the traditional model of transactions incorporated in contract law
represents just one of the possible models of the relevant social dynamics;
indeed, as applied to boilerplate it might even be thought of as the comer
solution that abstracts most completely from the phenomena to be observed.
As I have already said, the papers here presented do not come together to
suggest a single alternative. Instead, the overall conclusion to be drawn from
the work of this symposium is that we need to construct many--or at least
several-structural models if we are rightly to understand and respond to the
phenomena at issue.
Turning now to the prescriptive part of the matter, contract law, as al
ready discussed, has traditionally been justified by connecting its rules,
through its relatively simple view of personal dealings and market interac-

24.
Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of £
Standard Terms Backfire?, I 04 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2006).
25.
2004).

See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 6.1, at 105--06 (3d ed.

26.

Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, I AM.

Soc. REV. 894 (1936).

27.

Boardman, supra note 16, at 1107.
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tions, with individual freedom and the general welfare. These two broad
ideals remain relevant to the world of boilerplate. Although many of the
symposium articles take a general welfare norm as their criterion of good
law, or at least good contract law, enough is said or noticed to remind us that
the legal system has other goals as well-and especially, as regards boiler

plate, that we might care about its effects on freedom in one or another of its
guises. As Douglas Baird suggests, this point is of great relevance to perhaps

the most heated current debate regarding form contracts-the use of boiler
plate

to remove

large swathes of contracts

from the courts to

the

arbitrators.28 But it stretches much more broadly. Robert Hillman, for exam
ple, sees it implicated in how the terms of e-commerce are publicized.29
To complete our job, then, we need to consider how the law can connect

boilerplate as it works in several different dynamic situations with the over

all goals of furthering freedom and welfare. As some of the papers suggest,
a first approach to this problem in any particular instance is to look at the
existing rules and the existing institutional arrangements to see if the on-the
ground situation as it presently exists does enough to police the private use
of boilerplate---does enough to give us confidence that the result will tolera
bly achieve the preservation of freedom and provision of welfare.30 If so,
fine; if not, we need to consider the alternatives.
Some of the essays in this collection describe the alternatives in terms of
the substantive rules that should apply to specific situations-for example,
Douglas Baird's interesting re-analysis of the illegitimacy of the contract
clause at stake in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 3 1 But, by and
large, the alternatives are what might be thought of as legal-process alterna
tives: recommendations regarding the different law-making or law-applying
institutions that might best be given the job of drafting, interpreting, apply
ing, or rejecting boilerplate. In addition to the obvious possibilities of
legislation and judicial decision, the authors suggest in one setting or an
other turning matters over to expert administrative agencies,32 nonprofit

trade associations,33 law firms that are leaders in a field, 34 and even (although
somewhat uncertainly) publicity-minded watchdog groups.35 (This profusion

also, I think, reflects the sensibility of law and sociology.)
Which institutional set up best responds to which particular dynamic for

the drafting or use of boilerplate is obviously a question to be answered at

28.
See Baird, supra note 15, at 949-50. On the "mandatory arbitration" issue in general, see
Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract law, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 761 (2002), and the several articles in Symposium, Mandatory Arbitration, 61 LAW & CoN
TEMP. PRoes. I (2004).
29.

Robert A. Hillman, supra note 24, at 846-47.

30.

See Mann, supra note 18, at 910; see also Hillman, supra note 24, at 841-842.

31.

350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Baird, supra note 15, at 941-42.

32.

Mann, supra note 18, at 922-24.

33.

Davis, supra note 14, at 1099; Choi & Gulati, supra note 13, at 1139-41.

34.

See Choi & Gulati, supra note 13, at 1132.

35.

See Hillman, supra note 24, at 853.
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retail. But for precisely that reason, we need to give some thought to what
might be said in general about making those judgments. We can start by
saying that, if authoritative legal weight is the ultimate goal, then the basic
design question has to be made at some point by a constitutionally
established branch of government: judges or legislators. But obviously we
need to go further than that. How should we decide whether judges should
decide a matter themselves, or instead defer to a trade association by choos
ing to give it the power to offer authoritative interpretations of common
language? And how should we decide whether legislators should take an
issue away from judges through legislation-and then either decide the mat
ter themselves or in their tum delegate it to an administrative agency?
In one sense, this is not at all a new problem in the law of contracts.
"Who should authoritatively decide?" was necessarily an issue in, for exam
ple, the replacement in large part of the common law of sales by the
Uniform Sales Act and then the Uniform Commercial Code; in the super
cession in large part of the common law of securities transactions by acts of
Congress and rules of the S.E.C.; and in other like actions. If it be thought
that the driving force behind these movements was that different and spe
cialized dynamics were present in the sale of goods, in transactions for
securities, and so forth, then perhaps we are simply facing a new instance of
an old trend.
If so, probably the most traditional analysis of the conclusions we have
reached about boilerplate in terms of appropriate legal process would be
that, since it seems that we need different models to fit various phenomena
throughout the economy, primary emphasis should be put on action by legis
latures and administrative agencies. It is not that judges cannot build
models-they do it, sometimes very self-consciously, when deciding what
rules to apply to specific types of transactions, and they sometimes consider
36
specifically the role of boilerplate within those models. But looked at com
paratively, specialized administrative agencies-and to some extent the
staffs of legislative committees-can become expert about matters in their
particular domains in a way that general-jurisdiction judges cannot. The
processes used in agencies and legislatures allow for the development of a
scope of information and variety of methodology beyond what litigants
typically develop. Legislatures-and agencies too-naturally operate in the
real world of multiple interests, which can only be recreated artificially, if at
all, in the confines of a traditional lawsuit.
On this view, the judges would continue to apply to boilerplate the gen
eral common law model of contract, with its standard tests for enforceability
and its standard modes of interpretation, and would continue to police only
the outer margins of commercial practices through the doctrines of uncon
scionability or undue surprise. It would be left to legislatures to address
particular sectors of the economy in which the "general rules" of contract fit
so poorly that there was real distress, and they might do so either by enact
ing different rules on their own or by authorizing administrative agencies to
36.
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do so. The agencies could, in turn, decide when deference to the views of
private trade groups and the like was appropriate.
Perhaps that is the right analysis, but there are also real costs to viewing
judicial action so narrowly. Legislation directly, and administrative action
derivatively, depend on political action; and, rightly or wrongly, in the
United States, we have a set of political institutions intentionally structured
to make it difficult to develop the necessary political will. If we think appli
cation of the single legal framework of tradition to the manifold varieties of
boilerplate is often greatly overbroad, there are many "wrong" outcomes
lurking within that institutional conservatism. Moreover, the percentage of
contractual disputes that implicate boilerplate is so large, and the present
law, based on its simple model, fits them so poorly, that even if the judges
do only somewhat better than they are now doing, the improvement in the
law can be great. Even modestly sophisticated models ought to generate
better results in many cases.
In short, I fear that the traditional analysis of what is "best" may cause
us to lose sight of what is only "better." It is a mistake to assume that, be
cause the judges cannot do everything, therefore they can do, or ought to do,
nothing. In much of the writing on boilerplate-not necessarily in this col
lection-one senses just below the surface (and sometimes right on the
surface) a looming fear that, if the judges are unleashed, they will simply
muck up a situation in which the private parties are producing, if not a great
solution, at least a tolerable one. This attitude seems to me to hold the
judges to a higher standard than it holds those responsible for the boiler
plate. The courts also usually produce "if not a great solution, at least a
tolerable one." The question is whether the judges can improve on the prod
uct produced by those who write and use the boilerplate. If a reasonably
careful look shows that the dynamics of the on-the-ground situation do not
do much to police the private use of boilerplate-which as we have seen in
this symposium is a situation-by-situation question-then it seems to me
wrong to fear the judges' efforts.
Perhaps this phobia is fueled by a mistaken belief that, if the judges err,
there will be no further correction. But this is of course not true. Judges in
other jurisdictions may disagree; later judges in the same jurisdiction may
overrule. More generally, although what the judges say in interpreting, dis
placing,

or

revising

boilerplate

may

constitute

mandatory

rules

(or

mandatory allocations of powers to interpret) as regards the private parties,
judicial decisions, except in constitutional cases, represent only default rules
as regards the legal system as a whole. They are always subject to revision
by legislation or by properly authorized administrative action. Of course,
there will be some stickiness in getting these other institutions to act, and
that may mean that only if the judges produce a really bad result will they be
corrected. But as has already been said, the same stickiness means, if the
judges are not supposed to act, that only if the drafters of boilerplate pro
duce a really bad result will they be corrected. It is a question of who in the
system is allowed to take the initiative. If we think on balance that judges
will improve outcomes by trying to build models like those suggested by the
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authors in this symposium rather than by simply applying doctrines based
on the truncated model of ordinary contract law, then we should not only let
them, but indeed ask them, to try.
Moreover, if we are to sort out the welter of possible models regarding
boilerplate-if we are to develop an informed view of how many and what
sort of models are needed-participation by the judges offers us some im
portant intellectual advantages. Because they have a general jurisdiction and
because they have to explain and not merely declare the rules they apply,
judges in their ordinary work have to take a broad view of the whole terrain
and consider what the crucial features are that differentiate situations. By
contrast, law that depends on legislation or administrative regulation tends
to become (if I may borrow a term I have used elsewhere) "sectorized."37 A
different set of rules governs each sector of the economy, and for their le
gitimacy these rules trace back to specific enactments rather than to general
principles. Because each rule ultimately derives from a legislative enactment

representing a particular political moment, there is no reason why the rules
in different sectors should represent similar analyses or methodologies or
cohere in any way with each other. The structure of the legal materials de
feats rather than encourages development of a general understanding of the
phenomena.

It seems to me, therefore, that there is still a considerable role, practical

and intellectual, for judicial action. The alternative, it seems, is for the
courts to go on treating boilerplate and standard forms as if they were ordi
nary clauses in ordinary contracts. In many cases, in light of all that has
been said at this symposium, that will produce the wrong result; and even in
the cases in which it produces the right result, that right result will be ra
tionalized on traditional grounds and therefore, intellectually speaking,
accidental. The legal system as a whole certainly can do better, and in my
view, the judges can, too.
The recognition that boilerplate has an institutional context-that how it
is written and used, why it is written and used, and by whom it is written
and used make a difference-is both true and important. That it makes life
more complicated for those who study, teach, and write about contract law

only proves its worth. That it also makes life more complicated for the exist

ing institutions of the law cannot be denied, but it does not make sense to
respond by pretending that what is true is not so. Rather, we have to think
about the best way to pursue enough complexity to capture what is true
while at the same time generating law that is clear enough for practical so
cial purposes.
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